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I.

INTRODUCTION

Nearly every civil case that reaches the Montana Supreme
Court involves, at least marginally, some issue of civil procedure.
This survey discusses and analyzes the more important civil procedure decisions handed down by the Montana Supreme Court during 1983.
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1984
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JURISDICTION

JurisdictionOver Parties

The Montana Supreme Court temporarily stalled the expansion of Montana's long-arm jurisdiction1 when it ruled in Simmons
v. State2 that the State of Oregon had not established sufficient
minimum contacts with Montana to subject it to in personam jurisdiction by Montana courts.
The Montana Department of Health and Environmental Sciences (Montana Department of Health) is responsible for overseeing a test designed to detect metabolic disorders in all newborn
Montanans.' Because of prohibitive costs of establishing test facilities, the Montana Department of Health contracted, in early 1977,
for the Health Division of the Oregon Department of Human Resources (Oregon Department of Health) to perform metabolic tests
on blood samples taken from the estimated 12,000 people born in
Montana each year.' The contract price of $2.25 per test covered
merely the marginal cost of performing each test, and did not provide for any profit by Oregon or any contribution towards the general maintenance of the Oregon Department of Health laboratory.5
Breton Simmons was born on June 22, 1977, in Missoula,
Montana. Montana authorities sent his blood sample to the Oregon Department of Health laboratory in Portland, where tests revealed no metabolic disorder. When Breton was nearly three
months old he was diagnosed as having congenital anthyrotic hypothyroidism, a severe metabolic disorder.'
Breton's father, Dan Simmons, brought suit as guardian ad litem against the State of Oregon in Oregon district court, alleging
negligence by Oregon state employees for failing to detect Breton's
metabolic disorder. The Oregon court subsequently dismissed the
action for failure to prosecute. Dan Simmons filed a similar negligence action in Montana district court against both the State of
Montana and the State of Oregon. The Montana district court dismissed the action against Oregon because it lacked in personam
1.

"Long-arm jurisdiction" is the term applied to a state court's power to bring before

it parties who are not residents of the forum state. Long-arm jurisdiction is provided for in
MoNr. R. Civ. P. 4B(1). See infra note 8.
2.
3.
4.

Mont. -,
670 P.2d 1372 (1983).
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-19-201 to -204 (1983).
Simmons, Mont. at -,
670 P.2d at 1375.

__

5. Id.
6. Id.
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jurisdiction.7
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court traced the judicial
history of the expansion of long-arm jurisdiction and determined
that Oregon had neither committed a tort within Montana nor
contracted to perform services within Montana;' nor had it established systematic and continuous contacts with Montana.9 A Montana court, therefore, could not properly exercise in personam jurisdiction over the State of Oregon.
The court found that Oregon had not committed any tort
within Montana because all of the allegedly negligent acts by Oregon state employees were performed in Oregon.1" The court distinguished McGee v. Riekhof," in which the patient had traveled to
Utah for treatment, returned to Montana, then received a new diagnosis over the telephone from his doctor in Utah. In McGee the
plaintiff based his claim not on the previous treatment in Utah,
but on grounds that the proximate cause of his injury was the diag7. Id.
8. MoNT. R. Civ. P. 4B(1) states in pertinent part:
All persons found within the state of Montana are subject to the jurisdiction of
the courts of this state. In addition, any person is subject to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state as to any claim for relief arising from the doing personally,
through an employee, or through an agent, of any of the following acts:
(a) the transaction of any business within this state;
(b) the commission of any act which results in accrual within this state
of a tort action;
(c) the ownership, use or possession of any property, or of any interest
therein, situated within this state;...
(e) entering into a contract for services to be rendered or for materials
to be furnished in this state by such person ....
Rule 4B is the sole source of a Montana court's power to bring nonresident defendants
before it. In order for the State of Oregon to be brought into Montana courts, Simmons had
to show either: (1) that Oregon was transacting business in Montana; (2) that Oregon committed a tort within Montana; (3) that Oregon owned property within Montana; (4) that
Oregon entered into a contract to perform services within Montana; or (5) that Oregon's
business presence within Montana was so "systematic and continuous" that Oregon could be
"found within" Montana for jurisdictional purposes.
The court stated in Simmons that if it finds, "as a matter of statutory construction,
that the nonresident does not engage in any of the several activities enumerated in [the
Montana] long-arm statute," then the court's analysis must cease and it must decline jurisdiction. Id. at -,
670 P.2d at 1376.
9. "Systematic and continuous contacts" with the forum state are a means by which a
nonresident defendant may be "found within" the forum's jurisdiction. "Systematic and
continuous contacts" is a term of art deriving from International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). For further discussion of what constitutes "systematic and continuous contacts," see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Reed v.
American Airlines, Inc., Mont. _
,640 P.2d 912 (1982); May v. Figgins, 186 Mont.
383, 607 P.2d 1132 (1980); Harrington v. Holiday Rambler Corp., 176 Mont. 37, 575 P.2d
578 (1978).
10. Simmons, Mont. at , 670 P.2d at 1382.
11. 442 F. Supp. 1276 (D. Mont. 1978).
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nosis over the telephone by a doctor in Utah while his patient was
in Montana.1 2
Although the long-arm statute allows Montana courts to assume in personam jurisdiction over parties who contract to provide
goods or services in Montana, the court ruled that nonresident defendants do not necessarily subject themselves to long-arm jurisdiction merely by entering into a contract with a Montana resident.13 The court implied that the nonresident defendant must
establish a business presence within the state before Montana
courts may exercise in personam jurisdiction based on a contract."
The court placed significant emphasis on the facts that the State
of Oregon had no commercial interest in contracting with Montana
to perform the metabolic tests, that Oregon entered the contract
only after being solicited by Montana, that Oregon had no property or agents in Montana, and that Oregon was performing the
tests at a low price as a public service to the State of Montana.
Although the court engaged in an elaborate long-arm jurisdiction analysis, it could have disposed of Simmons v. State on comity considerations alone. The court acknowledged that one state is
not constitutionally immune from suit in another state.15 The
Court reasoned, however, that a Montana court's assumption of jurisdiction under the facts of Simmons "would impinge unnecessarily upon the harmonious interstate relations which are part and
parcel of the spirit of co-operative federalism." 6 The Oregon Department of Health was performing the metabolic tests as a lowpriced service to the people of Montana. The court determined
that hauling the State of Oregon into court in Montana, solely for
the convenience of a Montana resident who was attempting to benefit from Montana's higher statutory sovereign liability limits, did
not justify jeopardizing the harmonious relationship between the
sister states generally, and the interstate metabolic testing arrangement in particular.
The court also took the opportunity to criticize the practice of
forum-shopping. Simmons admittedly filed suit in Montana because Montana's statutory limit for a tort claim against the state is
$300,000,18 while in Oregon the limit against the state is $100,000.1'
12.
13.

Id. at 1279.
Simmons, -

Mont. at

-,

670 P.2d at 1380.

14. Id.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

670 P.2d at 1385 (citing Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979)).
670 P.2d at 1385.
Mont. at -,
670 P.2d at 1385-76.
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2-9-104 (1981) (repealed); 2-9-107 (1983) (temporary).
OR. REV. STAT. § 30.270 (1983).

Id. at -,
Simmons,
Id. at -,

-
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The court stated that "predicating jurisdiction on which forum
provides the highest possible damage award would be conducive to
the unacceptable practice of 'forum-shopping.' "20
B.

Effect of Invalid Long-Arm Jurisdiction on Subsequent
Actions

A fundamental principle of long-arm jurisdiction is that a
judgment rendered against a party not subject to the court's in
personam jurisdiction "is void in the rendering State and is not
entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere." ' 2 1 In Hughes v. Salo2 2
the Montana Supreme Court ruled that where a Colorado judgment against the defendant Montana resident was invalid for lack
of in personam jurisdiction, the cause of action was not res judicata
and the plaintiff could still seek recourse in Montana courts.
Salo was a Montana service station owner allegedly delinquent
in his contributions to a Teamsters pension fund. Hughes brought
action in Colorado to compel Salo's payment to the pension fund,
which was located in a Denver bank. Salo defaulted and judgment
was entered in favor of Hughes. Hughes then petitioned the Montana district court to enforce the Colorado judgment. The Montana court refused, relying on the rule of May v. Figgins2U that the
mailing of checks by a Montana resident to a Colorado bank did
not establish sufficient minimum contacts for Colorado to exercise
in personam jurisdiction over the noncomplying Montana resident.
Hughes then filed an original action in Montana district court.
Salo argued that the Colorado judgment, although invalid for lack
of in personam jurisdiction, was valid for purposes of barring
Hughes' Montana action. Salo contended that Hughes' Montana
action was barred by the doctrine of merger and the rule against
splitting causes of action.2 4 The Montana Supreme Court reasoned
that the Colorado judgment was a nullity in all respects, enforceable nowhere, not a judgment on the merits, and therefore not a bar
to plaintiff Hughes' refiling the action in a court with in personam
jurisdiction over Salo.
20. Simmons, __
Mont. at __,
670 P.2d at 1383.
21. World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732 (1878)).
22.
23.

-

Mont. -,
659 P.2d 270 (1983).
186 Mont. 383, 607 P.2d 1132 (1980).

24.

Hughes,

-

Mont. at

-,

659 P.2d at 271.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1984

5

Montana
Law Review,LAW
Vol. 45REVIEW
[1984], Iss. 2, Art. 8
MONTANA

[Vol. 45

III. DisMissAL OF ACTION
A. Pleading Affirmative Defenses
Under certain circumstances, affirmative defenses may be
raised in a motion to dismiss filed prior to the answering of the
complaint. In Beckman v. Chamberlain," the Montana Supreme
Court adopted the federal courts' interpretations of Rules 8(b) and
12(b)(6), 6 holding that
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief
may be granted will lie when the complaint on its face establishes
that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations, and the
usual requirement that
such a defense be affirmatively plead [sic]
27
need not be followed.

The supreme court also ruled that the defendant could raise the
affirmative defense of estoppel by judgment in the motion to dismiss, as the judgment relied upon was made in the very court
asked to pass upon the motion.28
Beckman involved a dispute over ownership of six acres of
wheat land. In 1978, Beckman sued Myllymaki, who exercised
rights of ownership over the disputed property, and lost because of
the plaintiff's complete failure to prove his allegations of trespass.
Beckman filed a second lawsuit in 1981, making the same allegations of wrongdoing covering the same time period as in the previous suit. The only change was that Beckman sued Chamberlain,
the tenant, instead of Myllymaki, the landlord. Instead of filing an
answer to the second complaint, Chamberlain filed a motion to dismiss and raised the affirmative defenses in that motion. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and the supreme court
affirmed.
B.

Conversion of Motion to Dismiss to Motion for Summary
Judgment

When matters outside the pleadings are presented to and considered by the court, Rule 12(b) allows a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted to be treated
as a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. The rule further
25.
- Mont. 673 P.2d 480 (1983).
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b) and 12(b)(6) are substantially the same as MoNT. R. CIv. P.
8(b) and 12(b)(6).
27. Beckman, Mont. at -, 673 P.2d at 482.
28. Id. at -,
673 P.2d at 481.
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states that "all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such motion by Rule 56. "29
In Gebhardt v. D.A. Davidson & Co.,30 the supreme court held that
the trial court has the duty affirmatively to notify the parties that
the materials outside the pleadings were not excluded and that the
motion to dismiss was converted to a motion for summary
judgment. 1
The supreme court noted that the parties are assumed to
know about the automatic conversion requirements of Rule 12(b).
But because the trial court has discretion to admit or exclude the
extra-pleading materials, the supreme court reasoned, it is imperative that the non-moving party know of the existence and consequences of the automatic conversion and have a reasonable opportunity to present all materials relevant to the Rule 56 motion for
summary judgment.3 2
IV.

VENUE

Action to Collect Attorney Fees

A.

In Whalen v. Snel 3 the supreme court held that the proper
venue for an action, brought by an attorney against a client to recover delinquent attorney fees, is either the county where the fees
should have been paid or the county of defendant's residence. The
court reasoned that the very nature of the attorney's business dictates that the client must fulfill his part of the bargain and pay
fees at the attorney's office.34 A client's failure to pay attorney fees
is usually considered either a breach of contract 5 or a tortious3 6
breach of duty to pay for services consumed. In either case the
breach occurred at the attorney's office, and the county in which
37
the breach occurred is a proper venue for the resulting action.
29.

MONT.

30.

__

31.

Id. at

32.

Id.

33.

-

34.

Id. at

35.
(1983).

R. Civ. P. 12(b).

Mont.

-,

661 P.2d 855 (1983).

661 P.2d at 858.

-,

Mont.
-,

__,

667 P.2d 436 (1983).

667 P.2d at 438.

Venue for actions in contract is provided for at MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-2-101

36.

Venue for actions in tort is provided for at MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-2-102 (1983).

37.

Whalen,

-

Mont. at

-,

667 P.2d at 437 (1983).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1984

7

Montana
Law Review,
Vol. 45REVIEW
[1984], Iss. 2, Art. 8
MONTANA
LAW

342
B.

[Vol. 45

Action Involving Breach of Warranty to Deliver Real
Property

The Montana Supreme Court held in Letford v. Kraus3" that
an action alleging breach of warranty to deliver real property without defective title is a contract action, not a real property action,
and therefore the proper venue is either the county of performance
or the county of defendant's residence. The fact that the property
subject to litigation was located in Granite County necessarily implied that performance of the contract by delivery of title free of
defect would take place in Granite County. 9
The court stopped short of ruling that the action was one for
the recovery of real property or for determining rights or interest
therein. Such determination would automatically have set venue in
the county in which the real property was located.40 The court did,
however, note that in contract actions involving real property, the
location of the real property is an important consideration in determining venue. 1
V.

STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS

A.

Legal Malpractice

The Montana statute of limitations for a legal malpractice action is three years from the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the event or events giving rise to the
4 8 the court held that
action.4 2 In Burgett v. Flaherty,
"what is critical in determining when a legal malpractice action accrues is
knowledge of the facts essential to the cause of action, not knowl'44
edge of the legal theories upon which an action may be brought.
The court reasoned that once the plaintiff has acquired facts that
would cause a reasonable person to question the competency of his
representation, he is on notice that a cause of action may exist and
the statute of limitations begins to run."
38.
39.
40.
located.
41.
42.
than 10
43.
44.
45.

- Mont. -, 672 P.2d 265 (1983).
Id. at -,
672 P.2d at 267.
Venue for actions involving real property is the county in which the property is
MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-2-103 (1983).
Letford, - Mont. at -,
672 P.2d at 267.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-206 (1983). In no case may an action be commenced more
years after the date of the alleged malpractice.
Mont. -,
663 P.2d 332 (1983).
Id at -,
663 P.2d at 334.
Id.
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B. Fraud
The Montana statute of limitations for fraud is two years from
"the discovery by the aggrieved party of facts constituting fraud or
mistake.

46

In Mobley v. Hall4 7 the court held that the "law does

not contemplate such discovery as would give positive knowledge
of the fraud, but such discovery as would lead a prudent man to
inquiry or action." 8
Mobley purchased a ranch from Hall, whose agents represented a certain number of the ranch's acres to be farmland.
Mobley first became suspicious in 1976, when the acreage meters
on both his seed drill and a borrowed plow showed significantly
fewer acres had been farmed than Hall had listed in sales
brochures and the contract for deed. Mobley had acreage measurements taken by the Agricultural Soil Conservation Service (ASCS)
and received the results on August 29, 1977. The results showed
significantly fewer acres of cropland than Hall had originally represented. Mobley then requested an aerial survey, and on November
1, 1977, he received results similar to those from the earlier survey.
The supreme court ruled that the statute of limitations began
to run on August 29, 1977, when Mobley became aware that an
official ASCS survey showed that the acreage measurements represented by Hall were significantly overstated. Mobley argued that
the statute of limitations began to run on November 1, 1977, when
he received the results of the aerial survey. The court reasoned
that the August 29 ASCS survey results were sufficient information
to put Hall on inquiry; therefore, he had actual knowledge of the
facts relevant to the action. 49 The fraud action, filed on October 18,

1979, was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. 0
VI.

DEFAULT

Rule 60(b) permits a court to relieve a party from a default
judgment if the default was caused by "excusable neglect.

5

1

The

defaulting party, however, must make a motion for such relief
within sixty days after the entry of default judgment. In Elk Run
46. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-203 (1983).
47. Mont. -, 657 P.2d 604 (1983).
48. Id. at -,
657 P.2d at 607 (quoting 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud & Deceit § 410 (1968)).
49. Mobley, Mont. at -,
657 P.2d at 607.
50. The court noted that the plaintiff "should not be precluded from amending the
complaint to include a cause of action for breach of contract." Id. The statute of limitations
for an action based on a written contract is eight years. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-202(1)
(1983).
51. MONT. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
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Ranch v. Green Line Implement Co., 52 the Montana Supreme
Court refused to waive the sixty-day motion period, even though
the plaintiff quietly waited through the sixty-day period before attempting to execute on the default judgment entered against the
defendant. By waiting to execute, the plaintiff succeeded in not
bringing the default judgment to the defendant's attention. The
court recognized "the inequity of permitting a plaintiff to passively
participate in securing a windfall default judgment resulting from
the excusable neglect of a defendant,"5 but refused to depart from
the sixty-day limit until the rule is properly changed.
VII.

INTERVENTION

Rule 24(a) requires that a person be allowed to intervene as a
party to an action when: (1) a statute confers an unconditional
right to intervene; or (2) the person claims an interest relating to
the property or transaction in issue, and his interest will likely be
impeded or impaired by disposition of the action.5 4 Rule 24(c) requires a party wishing to intervene to file a motion with the trial
court requesting leave of court to intervene.5 5 "The purpose of the
motion for leave to intervene is to give the District Court the opportunity to determine whether the parties seeking intervention
56
may intervene as a matter of right or by permission of the court."
The supreme court held in Schulz, Davis & Warren v.
Marinkovich5 7 that a party's failure to file a motion to intervene is
not necessarily fatal to its intervention.
Patricia Ori was a shareholder and director of M & M Enterprises, which owned and operated a hotel. Her husband, Dominic,
was not a shareholder but he had performed labor at the hotel
before M & M Enterprises sold the hotel. The plaintiff was a law
firm acting as trustee to hold the proceeds from the hotel sale, pay
the corporate debts, and make final disbursement of the corporate
assets among the shareholders. The various corporate directors
gave conflicting orders to the plaintiff regarding distribution of the
assets, so plaintiff brought an interpleader action against individual directors Patricia Ori, George Marinkovich, and Ann
Marinkovich. Patricia and Dominic Ori, without filing a motion for
leave of court for Dominic to intervene, filed a third party com52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Mont. -,
668 P.2d 258 (1983).
Id. at -,
668 P.2d at 260.
MoNT. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
MoNT. R. Civ. P. 24(c).
Schulz, Davis & Warren v. Marinkovich,
Mont.
, 661 P.2d 5 (1983).
-
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plaint and cross-complaint against M & M Enterprises for unpaid
wages, and against George Marinkovich for improperly relinquishing corporate personal property to the hotel buyer.
Neither the law firm nor Marinkovich objected to Dominic
Ori's de facto intervention in their answers to the third party complaint and cross-complaint. The first objection to Dominic Ori's intervention was made by Marinkovich's attorney at the opening of
the trial. The trial court overruled the objection.
The supreme court reasoned that Dominic Ori could intervene
as a matter of right because his wage claim could only be paid out
of the remaining assets of the corporation that was being liquidated. 8 The court held that the parties' failure to object to Dominic Ori's intervention prior to trial effectively waived any objections to his intervention.5 9 Although the decision appears to
expand the right to intervene and somewhat informalizes the intervention process, the court warned future litigants against attempting "to use this opinion to circumvent the clear requirements of
the rule. '" 60
VIII.

DIscovERY

Rule 35(a) provides for independent medical examinations of
parties whose mental or physical condition is at issue in a lawsuit.6 1 In Mohr v. District Court,2 the supreme court ruled that a
party subject to an independent medical examination is entitled to
have counsel present during the history taking portion of the examination. The court reasoned that a "lay person should not, without the assistance of counsel, be expected to evaluate the propriety
of every question" asked in the history taking portion of the independent medical examination. By having counsel present during
the history taking portion of the examination, a party can protect
his right to refrain from making statements or admissions that
might adversely affect his position."
The court refused to extend the right to have counsel present
at all stages of the independent medical examination, reasoning
that the need for efficiency in the court-ordered examination ex58.
59.
60.
1979)).
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at -,
661 P.2d at 8.
Id.
Id. (quoting In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 589 F.2d 786, 789 (5th Cir.
MoNT. R. Civ. P. 35(a).
__
Mont. -,
660 P.2d 88 (1983).
Id. at -,
660 P.2d at 89.
Id.
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ceeds the right to counsel.65 The court held that the trial court
should exclude from evidence any statements regarding medical
history that the doctor elicits from the party during the non-history taking portion of the independent medical examination.6 6
IX.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Rule 56(c) provides that a court may grant summary judgment
"if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue of fact as to any material fact and that
6' 7
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
The Montana Supreme Court has consistently ruled that, in considering a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable inferences
drawn from the offered proof are to be drawn in favor of the party
opposing summary judgment. 8
In the landmark products liability case of Brandenburger v.
Toyota Motor Sales, Inc.,69 the supreme court held that proof sufficient to avoid summary judgment may be made from inferences
drawn from circumstantial evidence. In 1983, the court further defined the Brandenburgerrule in Fauersov.Maronick Construction
Co.,70 holding that speculative or conjectural inferences were insuf71
ficient to raise a material issue of fact.
Plaintiff was a passenger in a car that collided with a retaining
wall in a dead-end alley. Maronick Construction had recently completed work on the alley. Plaintiff's primary witness, who lived in a
house adjacent to the alley, testified that he noticed the "deadend" sign had been taken down, and that he assumed that it was
removed by Maronick Construction employees during the construction project. The court ruled that such an inference was too
speculative to raise a material issue of fact; therefore the district
court appropriately granted summary judgment.
In Rogers v. Swingley,72 the court held that summary judgment is not appropriate where the testimony of a party opposing
the motion may reasonably be interpreted in more than one way,
and at least one of these interpretations leads to a material issue of
65. Id.
66. Id.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Mor. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Rogers v. Swingley, Mont. , 670 P.2d 1386, 1388 (1983).
162 Mont. 506, 517, 513 P.2d 268, 274 (1973).
Mont. -, 661 P.2d 20 (1983).
Id. at -,
661 P.2d at 23.
- Mont. _,
670 P.2d 1386 (1983).
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fact.
Swingley leased live mink from Rogers and the mink later became diseased. The case revolved on whether or not Swingley knew
of the disease in early 1981, when he executed a promissory note to
purchase the mink. At Swingley's deposition in an earlier case the
following exchange occurred between Swingley and an opposing
73
attorney:
Attorney: At one time you indicated that you had 70% of your
herd were [sic] infected with this particular disease. Is that
correct?
Swingley: Yes.
Attorney: What year was that?
Swingley: That was November of 1980.
The Montana court ruled that Swingley's earlier statements
could reasonably be interpreted in two ways: (1) that in November
1980, Swingley knew that the mink were diseased; or (2) that at
the time of his deposition in 1981, Swingley knew that the mink
had become diseased in November 1980. The court reasoned that
the latter interpretation raised a material issue of fact, and because
the rule required that all reasonable inferences be drawn in favor
of the party opposing summary judgment, summary judgment did
not lie. 4
X.

A.

JURIES

Jury Selection

statute,7'

By
each party in a civil action is entitled to exercise
four peremptory challenges when empaneling a twelve-member
jury. In 1981, the Montana Supreme Court approved the trial
court's granting of four peremptory challenges to each defendant
where codefendants occupy hostile positions. 6
In 1983, the supreme court in Adams v. Cheney" upheld a
trial court's order granting four peremptory challenges to each of
two sets of defendants, even though the defendants were represented by the same law firm. The court implored attorneys and
district courts to determine the allocation of peremptory challenges at the pretrial conference, and reaffirmed the rule from
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at -,
670 P.2d at 1388-89.
Id. at __, 670 P.2d at 1389.
MoNT. CODE ANN. § 25-7-224 (1983).
Lauman v. Lee, Mont. -,
626 P.2d 830 (1981).
Mont. -,
661 P.2d 434 (1983).
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78
Hunsaker v. Bozeman Deaconess Foundation:

The trial court should, as a bare minimum, rule on the peremptory challenge issue before the questioning of the jurors begins.
To afford a basis for review, [the trial court] should expressly set
ruling and the facts on
forth in the record the reasons for its
79
which it relies in making its decision.

Adams did not object to the court's apportionment of peremptory challenges until questioning of the jurors was complete. Because counsel dispensed with recording of voir dire, the supreme
court was restricted in its analysis to determine whether or not Adams could show: (1) that he used all of his own peremptory challenges; (2) that the trial court's action caused him material injury;
and (3) that as a result of the injury, at least one objectionable
juror sat on the case.80 Because Adams failed to convince the court
that he had suffered any material injury from the questionable distribution of peremptory challenges, the court refused to find reversible error.
B. Jury Instructions
Justice Weber wrote that the state of affairs in State Bank of
Townsend v. Maryann's, Inc.8" had made "it almost impossible to
analyze the confused record.'

2

Maryann's, Inc. began as an action

by the bank on a delinquent promissory note. The defendant counterclaimed for fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of the loan
agreement. The pretrial order indicated that fraudulent misrepresentation was the main issue to be raised by Maryann's. By the
end of the trial, Maryann's had changed the basis of its counterclaim to negligent misrepresentation. The pretrial order was never
amended to reflect Maryann's change in strategy.
The case went to the jury with instructions and a verdict form
that were confusing because, as is often the case, 83 they included:
(1) a question asking if the defendant was negligent; (2) a question
asking if the plaintiff was negligent; (3) a question asking the jury
to apportion responsibilities for plaintiff's injuries between plain78.
79.

179 Mont. 305, 588 P.2d 493 (1978).
Adams, Mont. at -,
661 P.2d at 443 (quoting Hunsaker, 179 Mont. at 318,

588 P.2d at 501).
80.

Adams,

Mont. at

-

-,

661 P.2d at 442 (citing Leary v. Kelly Pipe Co., 176

Mont. 511, 549 P.2d 813 (1976)).
81.

-

Mont.

-,

664 P.2d 295 (1983).

664 P.2d at 298.
82. Id. at _
83. The trial court submitted a similar sequence of instructions and verdict form to
the jury in Harry v. Elderkin, 196 Mont. 1, 637 P.2d 809 (1981).
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tiff and defendant; (4) a question asking what plaintiff's damages
were, but which was not clear whether it meant damages before
being discounted by plaintiff's own negligence, or after such discount; and (5) an instruction that essentially quoted the Montana
comparative negligence statute." Notwithstanding the confusing
instructions, the Maryann's, Inc. jury came to a decision. It
awarded the defendant $150,000 for the bank's negligent misrepresentation, less $16,015.87 found to be due and owing to the bank
on the promissory note.
Because the instructions led to a denial of "substantial justice," the supreme court reversed the judgment.8s The court went
on to treat the source of the problem by apparently adopting the
dissent of Justice Sheehy in Harry v. Elderkin.se The rule to be
derived from that case and Maryann's, Inc. appears to be that
when a special verdict is used, the jury must be specifically instructed in how to use it.8 7 Because a jury should not be given an
instruction designed to be used with a general verdict when a special verdict is in fact used, the instruction based on Montana's
comparative negligence statute should not have been given.s
84. Maryann's, Inc., Mont. at -,
664 P.2d at 298. In the instant case, the
questions actually involved defendant's counterclaim, so the usual roles of plaintiff and defendant were reversed. The Montana comparative negligence statute is found at MoNr.
CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 (1983).
85. Maryann's, Inc., Mont. at
, 664 P.2d at 300-01. The court applied the
"plain error" doctrine in the absence of adequate objections and alternate instructions of-

fered by the parties. Id.
86. 196 Mont. 1, 9, 637 P.2d 809, 814 (1981) (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
87. In his Elderkin dissent, id. at 13, 637 P.2d at 816, Justice Sheehy suggested the
following instruction derived from BAJI 15.15 (1975):
You shall now retire and select one of your number to act as foreman who will
preside over your deliberations.
In this case you will not return a general verdict in favor of either party.
Instead, it will be your duty to return only a special verdict in the form of written
answers to such of the issues upon which you have been directed to make findings
as are required according to the directions in the form of special verdict which will
be submitted to you.
As soon as eight or more identical jurors have agreed upon every answer required by such directions, so that each of those eight or more may be able to state
truthfully that every answer is his or hers, you shall have your verdict signed and
dated by your foreman and then shall return with it to this room.
In Maryann's. Inc., the court stated that a "similar" instruction "properly could be
used." Id. at
, 664 P.2d at 301. The latest version of the relevant California instruction
is BAJI 15.52 (1982 New). Use of the California comparative negligence special verdict form,
BAJI 14.96 (1977 Revision), would also mitigate jury confusion.
88. Maryann's, Inc., Mont. at , 664 P.2d at 301; Elderkin, 196 Mont. at 1013, 637 P.2d at 814-16 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
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Jury Practice

The Montana Supreme Court clearly described the jury's responsibility in Jarussiv. Board of Trustees,89 when it stated: "The
law requires only that the trier of fact exercise calm and reasonable judgment and the amount of the award rests of necessity in the
sound discretion of the trier of fact."
Jarussi, a popular teacher and school administrator, sued the
St. Ignatius School Board for violating the Montana open meeting
laws,90 improper termination, and unlawful retaliation. The jury
awarded Jarussi $16,500 for his loss on the sale of his property and
$2300 moving expenses, all of which Jarussi incurred as a result of
his termination and subsequent move to new employment in
Alaska. The court reasoned that, because the amount of damages
was clear and uncontradicted, "a short period of jury deliberation
and a unanimous verdict will not support a claim of excessive damages influenced by passion or prejudice." 9'

XI.

APPELLATE PROCEDURE

In 1979, the Montana Supreme Court accepted a trial court's
certification of reasons for granting a new trial, even though the
trial court filed its certification after it entered its final order and
the appellant filed its notice of appeal.92 In 1981, the court ruled in
Churchill v. Holly Sugar Corp.93 that, except for ancillary matters,
the trial court loses its jurisdiction once a party has filed a notice
of appeal with the supreme court. Therefore, the Churchill court
reasoned, the trial court may not file supplemental findings explaining its reasons for its decision. The court found it prejudicial
against the appellant to allow the trial court to cover its tracks by
cleaning up the evidentiary and legal record after the appellant
files notice of appeal."
In 1983, the supreme court twice faced the issue of the propriety of the trial court's filing supplemental findings after it had entered its final order and the appellant had filed notice of appeal. In
89. Mont , 664 P.2d 316, 318 (1983).
90. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 9; MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2-3-201 to -203; 20-3-322 (1983).
664 P.2d at 319.
91. Jarussi, - Mont. at _,
92. Giles v. Flint Valley Forest Products, 179 Mont. 382, 588 P.2d 535 (1979). The
Giles court did not expressly rule on the propriety of accepting the subsequent certification
of reasons; it merely accepted the certification after discussing the grounds necessary for
ordering a new trial pursuant to MoSr. R. Civ. P. 59(0.
Mont. -,
629 P.2d 758 (1981).
93. 94. Id. at 629 P.2d at 760. The Churchill court flatly stated that it would not

consider such findings filed subsequent to the final order. Id.
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the first case, the court cited Churchill as controlling and ruled in
Shannon v. Hulett"" that a trial court's findings and order, entered
after the trial court's order granting a new trial, as a matter of law
fail to elucidate the trial court's reasons for granting a new trial.
Therefore, the supreme court ruled that it would not consider such
subsequent findings on appeal."
Nine days later, in Klaudt v. Flink,' 7 the supreme court expressly overruled the short-lived Churchill decision. The court
held that the trial court's certification of reasons for its decision,
entered subsequent to the filing of the notice of appeal, could be
considered on appeal, so long as the trial court's subsequent certification complied with Rule 54(b)." Even though the court devoted
three full paragraphs in Churchill to explain its reasoning, the
court in Klaudt gave very little, if any, reasoning for overruling
Churchill.

95. Mont. , 656 P.2d 825 (1983).
96. Id. at , 656 P.2d at 826. Chief Justice Haswell dissented, relying on Giles in
reasoning that the subsequent certification satisfies MoNT. R. Civ. P. 59(0, which requires
that reasons for a new trial be stated with particularity in either the body of the order or in
an attached opinion.
Mont. -, 658 P.2d 1065, 1066 (1983).
97. 98. MoNT. R. Civ. P. 54(b) allows trial courts to enter, where appropriate, final judgment concerning less than all the claims for relief or less than all the parties to an action,
provided there are multiple claims for relief or multiple parties to the action. The purpose
of this rule is to allow for immediate appeal upon distinctly separate claims, rather than
waiting for final judgment regarding all the claims or all the parties to the action. 10 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2654 (2d ed. 1983).
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